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Behavioral Game Theory 
COLIN F. CAMER ER 
People deviau from ,lie predic/;OIIS of game Iheory in two systemalic ways. 
Thry are not pllreiy self-illleresied (they care abom /airnnJ and try 10 coopu-
ate with OIlrers). and they do not ulu'oys consider Whol olhu players will do 
before making choias. Hawn-fr, 'I4';lh tX/Nrience. Ihest del'io/ions sometimes 
disapf"or. People learn when they can afford /0 be unfarr and what olhers will 
do: Iheir behm'ior oftell com'erges to a gamf-/heart/ic equilibrium. A ~hov­
ioral gaml' lh('ol)' lhal up/ains Ihe mllial d~iations fand Ilrelr disappear-
anu) could ~ lise/ul, tSfHciolly if Ihe learning process is modelt'd carefully 
and INlter dow aft gathered. 
B EHAV IORAL DECISION THEORY i; a catalog of ways in which judgmentS and 
choices deviale from normative decision theory and of psychological explana-
tion of these deviations. Despite the formal kinship bet",,,,,,n decision and 
games. there is no behavioml game theory. Ln this chapter. I describe some 
data that suggcst a basis for behavioral game theory. 
My approach expands the simple way in which special features of games 
(as compared 10 decisions or competitive markets) are treated in normative 
game theory. Games have two special features: players might care about the 
payoffs others get. and players must malee judgments about the choices others 
make (and aboul their own future cboices. in dynamic games). In game the-
ory. it is genemlly assumed that people are self-interested-they do not care 
about the payoffs of others-and use introspection to make accumte judg-
ments about the choices of others (who are making simultaneous judgmentS 
by introspection. ad infinitum) . 
These assumptions are useful for deriving sbarp equilibrium predictions. 
Without them. game theory is still quite useful as a system for classifying so-
cial situations (Aumann 1985). The important question is whether the as-
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sumptions are violated systematically enough for an a1lernative theory to be 
useful. 
A wide array of evidence suggests that they are. Preferences are more com-
plicated than simple self-interest. but they are highly COntext dependent. 
Judgments about choices of others are less complicated than introspective 
equilibrium calculalions. but they converge to those calculations as people 
learn from feedback over lime. 
There are other useful ways to do behavioral game theory. One way is 10 
ask how the lessons of behavioral decision theory apply in games. For in-
stance. one can ask how outcomes of bargaining sirualions depend on the way 
negotiators frame outcomes. This approach has been taken successfully by 
others in bargaining (e.g . . Bazerman and Carroll 1987: Mumpower 1988); I 
will not retrace their steps. Behavioral decision theory also points out psycho-
logical features, like the importance of cootext and conditions for learning, 
that are useful in understanding the empirical convergence of behavior 10 
game-theoretic predictions. Another useful direction is to reexamine the 
normative status of game theory. In this reexaminations. behavioral con-
siderations arise naturally from wondering how people think about games 
rather than from empirical evidence. Binmore (1987), Rubinstein ( 1988), and 
Fudenberg and Kreps ( 1988) are provocative this way. 
NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS 
A game consists of players (i = I, .... n); slralegi .. that players choose 
(5, for player i): oU/comes that result from Slrategy choices. a function of the 
vector (5, . ... , s.); preferences that players have for outcomes. including 
lotteries over possible outcomes (Ui Is, . ... ,5.1); and rules about the order 
of moves, the information players bave at each point. and so on. I will discuss 
only games played noncooperatively. in which players cannot make binding 
agreements about what to choose. Wbereas noncooperative game theory is 
concerned with the strategies that players choose, cooperali"e game theory is 
mostly concerned with the division of gains from the strategies that are chosen 
by binding agreement. A noncooperative game can be shown in a tree ("'ex-
tensive form") or in a matrix ("strategic" or "normal form") . 
The obvious question in a noncooperative game is what strategies players 
will choose . Nash ( 1951) suggested that players might choose strategies that 
ane best responses to eacb other. Such strategies form a Nash equilibrium. 
Formally, (' .... . 5;) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
U,(S;, . ... s;, .. . . s:);::e (sit .. · . sr •. ··• 5:) (I) 
for all S it i. Nash equilibrium is a simple solution concept with attractive 
properties: an equilibrium always exists for games with finitely many strate-
gies and players, and it is easy to calculate and explain . Many other equi-
librium concepts extend Nash's idea (e.g., Aumann 1987) or refine it (see 
below). 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. First , experimental evidence about 
preferences-tastes for fairness and cooperation- is reviewed. Next. data 
about judgments of future choices and the choices of others are discussed . 
(These discussions are extremely selective. intended to illustrate arguments 
rather than provide comprehensive review. For more thorough reviews. see 
Roth 11987]. Kahan and Rapopon [1984], and McKelvey and Ordeshook 
11987J on cooperative games, Colman [1983] on experiments, and Aumann 
119851 for wisdom.) Then, some parallels to behavioral decision theory are 
discussed. A final section offers conclusions and ideas for further research. 
PREFEReNCES 
Fairness 
People prefer payoffs that are fair. This is not inconsi tent with game theory 
because players are assumed to have utility for an outcome, which produces a 
vector of payoffs (one for each player). A player's utility can cenainly depend 
on the payoffs that others get. Assuming that there is no dependence-pure 
self-interest- is simply a convenient benchmark , like the assumption of risk 
avers ion in risky choice. If we reject the self-interest assumption, we do not 
reject game theory. 
In fact, we can reject the self-interest assumption. Furthermore. we cannot 
account for fairness preferences by simply assuming that people care about 
the payoffs of others because their caring depends idiosyncratically on con-
text. Let us see some examples. 
The Coase Theorem. The Coase theorem is the conjecture that socially effi-
cient outcomes will result, regardless of who has the right to make decisions 
about imposition of economic "externalities," as long as people can bargain 
cheaply.' 
Many experiments have tested this conjecture in very simple settings (see 
Hoffman and Spitzer 1982, 1985, 1986). In a typical experiment. a ··control-
ler'· subject A chooses one of several possible divisions of money between A 
and B, for example, (4, 10), (6, 6). or (11, 0). (These divisions represent 
costs and benefits to two panies because of different economic externalities.) 
The controller and B bargain with each other in an unstructured way, but the 
controller has the right to choose any division she wishes if they disagree. 
Since the experimenter has made it easy for the players to bargain, the Coase 
1. An externulity is any effect one J*1Y has on another, good or bad. that lies outside their eco-
nomic relattonship. Examples include watching an al1racli\'e man or woman, hearing a baby 
scream on an airplane. or being II"lllJPC'd on a boat lislening 10 a band you dislike. Coase (1960) 
argued that. ir bargaining belwcen pwties is easy. the socially effiden! outcome would ~sull ~. 
gardless or who has the "property ripI" 10 impose or prevent the externality. 
theorem predicts that controllers will choose the division with the largest total 
payoff (the sociaUy eflicient outcome), then demand a payment from B. In the 
example, the self-interested controller should choose (4, 10), then demand a 
side payment of at least 7 to bring her total to II (because she could pjck 
111,0] if she wanted to). 
In the experiments. subjects almost always chose the eflicient outcome, but 
controllers got adequate side payments in only a third of the cases; they often 
split the eflicient outcome evenly (7. 7). Similar results are found with larger 
groups (Hoffman and Spitzer 1986), in a two-firm market setting (Prodencio 
1982). and when the subjects bargain over payments for drinking a distasteful 
substance (Coursey, Hoffman. and Spitzer 1987). Even splits are Common in 
many other bargai ning si tuations too (Roth 1987). 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) explored two ways to make subjects tolerate 
uneven splits: in a "moml authority" treatment, subjects were told that they 
"earned the right" to be controller; in a "game trigger" treatment, subjects 
became controller if they won a simple game of skill (Nim). Both changes in 
context led controller subjects toward more uneven allocations. (The moral 
authority treatment was stronger, which goes curiously unmentioned in many 
discussions of the results.) Harrison and McKee (1985) found that having sev-
eml practice periods with no controller, which generally led to disagreement 
and ineflicient outcomes. led to uneven splits in later periods. These data sug-
gest that an unequal division can be acceptable to people if they think that the 
right to the larger share has been earned. 
Ultimatum Games. More evidence of preferences for fair allocations comes 
from " ultimatum games." In an ultimatum game, the divider divides a SIO 
"pie"bykeepingOandgiving$IO - Otoanaccepter(writtenIO.IO - Oil. 
She accepts the division , and they get paid; or she rejects it, and they gel 
nothing. (Ultimatum games are not common in life. but they are a lens 
through which attitudes toward others' payoffs can be seen. They also underlie 
more elaborate theories of bargaining, discussed below_ that do apply to com-
mon situations.) 
There are many Nash equilibria of the ultimatum game, but, in the ntOSI 
reasonable ("subgame perfect")' equilibria. the divider should leave a penny 
(or nothing) to the accepter. A purely self-interested accepter will pick up the 
penny. unenthusiastically. 
People do not actually play ultimatum games so ruthlessly; they ~ 
2. Any division (D. 10 - D) is a Nash equilibnum if the divider believes that the accepIeI' 
would reject all other divisions. BUI sucb a belief seems paranoid and inconsistent: \I asswnes 
actions in pans of the game (subgames) thai people would noI actually lake if lhosc parts v.ae 
rt:ached . Such an equilibrium is not subgamc perfect . The division (5, 5) is a Nash equilibrium.. 
but it is nOl subgamc: perfect because it assumes thallhe accepter will rt:ject (9, I) (or any ocher 
division less favorable than (5. 5» if the (9. I) subgamc is reached. If the (9. I) subgame is 
reached, a self-interested accepter will accept rather than reject. 
BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 
around 40 percent of tbe pie for the accepter. Splits leaving less than 20 
percent to fie accepter are often rejected, contrary co pure self-interest.:' Auc-
rioning off the right to divide does not change the results much (Giith and 
Tietz J 986). 
Buying from a monopoly is like playing an ultimatum game (see also 
Thaler 1988, 202-3). For example. in a "posted offer" experiment. a single 
seller posts a price at which she will seH a good. Buyers should buy jf rheir 
reservation price is above the offered price and reject the offer otherwise. 
(Since the price is posted! and .fixed. there is no room for haggljng.) In experi-
menrs. buyers sometimes refu 'ed to buy. even when the good was wort.h more 
ro them than it cost (Smith 1981: Coursey, Isaac. and Smith 1984). These 
buyers were either trying to force prices down or were pun.ishjng the monopo-
list for posting unfair prices. Their efforts resemble boycotts. like the one en-
dorsed by New York City mayor Ed Koch to punish movie Iheaters for raising 
ticket prices to $7 in the 19805. Boycotts lnspired by fairness are prob'ably Dot 
effective in the long run-Koch's was not-bu.t they may prevent prices from 
adjusting rapidly to changes. 
There is corroborating evidence of 'tastes for fairness or aJtruism from 
many sources . Selten (1987) reports evidence from cooperative game experi-
ments. Loewenstein. Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) found that people 
disliked differences between their payoffs and others' payoffs (especially dif-
ferences favoring others) and that their dislike was marginally decreasing . 
Many earl.ier srudies found similar resulrs. 
While people are not purely ~elr-iFltcrested, \" re (;annot just assume thar 
they have a utility for payoffs of others;. whether 'they do depends on context 
(as the Coase t.heorem dafa show), Our attention must shift to precisely bow 
context matters. 
Surveys of hypothetical siruati.ons are one usefull way to study the impiicir 
rules that people have for relating faimess to context. The rules uncovered [his 
way do not correspond closely (0 formal rules in game theory (Yaari and Bar-
Hille! 1984) or economics (Kahneman, Knerscb, and Thaler 1986a. I 986b). 
except perhaps for M.B .A. students (Kunreuther 1986) . For example, bio-
logical need is considered a fairer basis for a disproportionate cfaim than 
simple desi.re (Bar-Hillel and Yaari 1987). Ration.ing scarce objects by raising 
prices is considered less fair than making people wait in lines or win loneries 
3 Gurh, Schminberger, ilnd Schwarze (1982) found mat dividers left an average of 35 percent of 
the pIC (with expericncl':. 31 percent) . I.n K"hneman . Knctsch. and Thaler (1986;1). dividers left 
45 percc:nl of [he PIC; mas' of Ihe dj yjsjons were equal splits. in classroom replications. my stu-
dents lefl 39 percent of a S 10 pie and 38 percent of a $100 pie. (One pie of e.ach size was acrually 
dividc'd . ) 
Guth, Schminberger. and Schwane\ inexperienced SUbjClt~ rejected (WO of 21 di\i~il)ns,. whi\:h 
left an average of 10 percem to the accepler. Experienced subjl!l-rs rejecled six of 21. ka\'ing an 
average of 22 percent. Kahneman. Knetsch, and Thaler's subjccts rejected unlc~s they gO! 23 
perce ll\. \-fy >-[Udt!1l1~ f\.:.[CC{e(i unless tbey got 21 percent of S! 0 or J 5 pj;"f("~~m of S I 00 . 
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for them . People do not object to wage freezes during times of inflation_ 
which reduce real. inflation-adjusled wages-but they think that absolute 
wage decreases are unfair. These sludies suggesl that the context of economic 
transactions flavors their fairness in subtle. idiosyncratic ways. 
Cooperation 
The instinct to cooperdte is another kind of preference that departs from 
strict self-intcresl. Cooperation is indicative of concern for others because it 
may result from an aversion to the unfairness that results from uncooperative 
choices. Some examples will illustrate the point. 
Social Dilemmas and Public Goods. In a social dilemma. a person' contribu~ 
tion henefits the group more than it henefits her. (In a typical experiment, 
can keep $5 or give it back to the experimenter. who distributes $1 each to 10 
people . ) She prefers to withhold the contribution ("free ride"). but, if every-j 
one withholds. each individual is wor.;e ofT. Many social situations, for ex-
ample. bystander helping, resemble social dilemmas (Stroehe and Frey 1982). 
In economics. social dilemmas arise in the funding of "public goods," goods 
that can be supplied to additional people at low marginal cost and that people 
cannot be excluded from consuming (such as national defense or public art). 
There have been many experimental studies of social dilemmas (mainly by: 
sociologists and psycbologiSlS) and public goods (mainly by economists and 
political scientists). I will describe them very briefly. For more complete re 
views, see Dawes (1980). Dawes and Orbell (1981). Messick and Brewer 
(1983). and Dawes and Thaler (1988). 
The most basic finding is that subjects contribute more to public goods than: 
thcy should according to pure self-interest. In itial contributions averagej 
around half the optimal level, then dwindle to 10-20 percent (Marwell and 
Ames 1979, 1980. 1981: Brubaker 1982: Isaac. McCue . and Plou 1985; Kim 
and Walker 1984: Harrison and Hirshleifer. in press) . People who value !be 
public good more highly or have more resources contribute more (e.g .. 
Rapoport 1988). 
Subjects who contribute initially may do so because they have not learned 
to free ride or hecause they are building reputations for cooperativeness. 
which induces cooperation in others (see the discussion of reputation g_ 
helow). Andreoni ( 1988) noticed reputation building among players paimI 
with the same group in a series of IO-period games. In the first IO-period 
game. contributions hegan at a higb level in the first period and gradually 
dwindled. In the first period of a second IO-period game. contributiOllS 
jumped up from the low level to which they had dwindled to a high level. as if 
some subjects were trying to rekindle cooperation. 
Many experiments have studied step-level public goods, which yield i 
creasing benefits 10 participants in discrete increments (e.g .. a bridge or a fleel 
of ships). An elegant experimental paradigm for such goods was proposed by 
van de Kragt. Orbcll. and Dawes (1983). Each of N players is given E dollars, 
which they can keep or contribute. If M players contribute (the " minimal con-
tributing set"). the public good is supplied, and all players get R (witb 
R > E). In step-level public goods. free riding is not a dominant strategy. If a 
player expects M - I others to contribute, then it pays for ber to contribute, 
earning R instead of E. 
Roughly half the players contribute to step-level public goods (e.g .. van de 
Kragt et a1. 1986; Rapoport 1988) if there is no discussion . (Discussion al-
most always enables groups to ensure that M players contribute; see van de 
Kragt. Orbcl1. and Dawes 1983). In the " no greed" game (Simmons. Dawes. 
and Orbcll 1983). contributions are required from everyone if M people con-
tribute, Contributions are much more frequent (about 90 percent) in this 
game; it seems that people do not contribute in regular games because they 
can both keep thei r endowment and share the public good. 
The evidence against strong free riding is so overwhelming that thoughtful 
researchers have begun to study conditions under which more and less cooper-
ation oceun-.. In social dilemmas. discussion about contributions works won-
ders, roughly doubling contributions from one- to two-thirds (Dawes, 
McTavish. and Shaklee 1977). A "sermon" by the experimenter increases 
contributions too (cL the success of telethons). Group discussion about some-
thing other than the game and time to think about the dilemma do nOl belp. 
Orbcll. van de Kragt. and Dawes (in press) found that subjects in a discus-
sion group would contribute twice as often if they thought during the discus-
sion that their contributions benefited members of their own group rather than 
members of a separate group (created minutes earlier by randomly dividing 
one large group into two). It seems that discussion crcates group identity and 
loyalty quickly and persistently (Dawes, van de Kragt. and Orbcll 1988); 
moreover. much weaker conditions do too (such as giving subjects a common 
random payoff; Kramer and Brewer 1986). 
Cooperation in Bargaining. In cooperative games with incomplete informa-
tion. players are assumed 10 have private information about their own vaJues . 
The important question is how they will divide the gains from cooperating . 
Much of the theoretical research in this area centers around a formal equiva-
lence-the ·'revelation principle"-between freewheeling bargaini ng among 
players and structured bargaining guided by an outside arbitrdtor (e.g .. 
Myerson 1986). The theories usual ly predict that inefficiencies are necessary 
to keep players from lyi ng about their information to the (mythical) arbitrator. 
For instance, in Forsythe. Kennan . and Sopher's (1987) bargaining games 
with two players. one "informed" player knew the size of the pie to be split 
(e.g. , either S6 or SI. equally likely) . The two players had 10 minutes to de-
cide how to split the pie; if they could not agree. they got nothing. To keep the 
informed player honcst, there must be some penalty for claiming that the pie is 
small wben it is actually large (" we do not have enough profit to pay for a 
wage increase"). The theoretical penalty is a chance of disagreement when 
the pie is small (akin to labor strikes): such disagreements are very costly 
when the pie is actually large. For example. suppose that the pie is $6 butlbat 
the informed player says that the pie is $ I. offers a $.50-$.50 split. and pr0-
vokes a disagreement. Then the opponunity to split 56 has been lost. If such 
disagreements are sufficiently likely, the informed player should not lie. 
Another maintained assumption in the theory is that informed players 
should make the same olTers whether the pie is 56 or $ I . They did not. About 
a third of the time. when the informed player knew the pie was $6, she offered 
more than $1 to the other player (e.g., a 53-$3 splil). immediately revealing 
that the pie was not $ I . (Experience did not diminish the number of revealing 
olTers.) Revealing olTers were costly because informed players who made 
them ended up earning $ I less than informed players who were more inscru_ 
table . However. by revealing the size of the pie, informed players provoked 
fewer disagreements than the theory predicted. which increased the total earn-
ings of all subjects. 
Radner and SchOller (1987) experimented with games in which a buyer and 
seller know their value and cosl. respectively. and both players know the dis-
tributions of possible values and costs. Each player writes down a bid or ask 
price. If the bid and ask overlap. a trade takes place at a price midway be-
tween them; otherwise. there is DO trade. (If the buyer bids S4 and the seller 
asks $2. a trade takes place at the price of $3 .) 
It is optimal for players to bid somewhat less than their values (e.g .• bid S2 
if the valuation is $3) and ask more than their cose. Behaving this way maxi-
mizes the expected gain from trading. but it causes inefficiencies because 
some trades that should take place do not. SUbjects in experiments bid much 
closer to their true values than they should. This "irrationality" caused much 
less inefficiency than the theory predicted . as if subjects were cooperating 10 
maximize their collective gains from trade (taking the most money from the 
experimenter). Face-to-face bargaining was the most efficient of all. 
The pie-spliuing and bid-ask data suggest that subjects are unwilling 10 
conceal their private information completely (or are unable to do so because 
the "availability" of information in memory makes them think that ocbcrs 
lenow it too: see Camerer, Loewenstein. and Weber 1989). Their behavior is 
cooperative because it requires personal sacrifice-revealing information hurts 
informed players-that benefits players collectively. just as contributing iD 
the social dilemma does. 
JUDGMENTS ABOUT FUTURE CHOICES IN DYNAMIC GAMES 
In decisions, people make judgments about random events: in games. 
people must make judgments about the choices of others . In dynamic games. 
people must malee judgments in early stages about what they will do 18ICI". 
These judgments are initially myopic; people do not anticipate what will hap-
pen in future plays and use those anticipations to make good choices in early 
plays. However. in most experiments , people learn not to be myopic . 
S~quenlial Bargaining 
Rubinstein ( 1982) pioneered the study of allernating-offer sequential bar-
gaining games in which player I makes an offer. player 2 accepts it or rejects 
it and makes a counteroffer (which player I accepts or rejccts). and so on. 
One can study the effect of bargaining costs by making the size of the pie 
shrink each period by a fixed percentage (representing impatience or a dis-
count rate) or by a fixed amount (representing bargaining costs). For a review 
of theory in this area, see SUllon (1986). 
The tendency toward fairness in ultimatum games led many experimenters 
to study these more complicated sequential bargaining games. which end in 
ultimatums. For example , Neelin. Sonnenschein, and Spiegel (1988) used 
2-.3-, and 5-period games (cf. Binmore, Shaked, and SUllon 1985, 1988) . In 
the 3-period game. the pie sizes were $5 , $2.50. and SI .25. The perfect equi-
librium prediction is that the player moving first should keep S3 .75 and offer 
51.25 to the second player (who should accept the offer). 
(In the third period, an ultimatum game. the first player could demand 
51 .25 in theory. AntiCipating th is, the second player could demand only SI .25 
of the 52 .50 pie in the second period; if she took more, the first player would 
refuse and move on to the third period to get $1 .25. Anticipating both stages, 
the first player can demand S3 .75 initially, leaving the second player SI.25, 
the amount she could get by refusing and moving to the second stage.) 
Subjects played very close to the perfect equilibrium prediction in the 
2-period game. but they acted as if the 3- and 5-period games would only last 
2 periods . For instance, in the 3-period game, subjects typically offered $2.50 
(50 percent of the pie) initially, as if the second period were an ultimatum 
game and the second player could certainly earn $2.50 (though it was not) . 
Perfect equilibrium also predicts badly in the comprehen,ive study by Ochs 
and Roth (1989) and in 2-period games in which the pie shrinks by 10 or 90 
percent (Giith and Tietz, 1988). 
In these experiments. subjects did not usually play the entire multiperiod 
game because first-period offers were accepted 80-90 percent of the time . In 
similar experiments on multiperiod assets_ subjects underestimate the impor-
tance of future periods for current-period asse t prices until they have actually 
lived through the future periods (e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey, PIOll 1982). Know-
ing this. Harrison and McCabe (1988) replicated the 3-period game results of 
Neelin. Sonnenschein, and Spiegel with a clever twist. 
Their subjects played an entire 3-period game, then played a separate 
2-period game in which the pies were 52 .50 and $1.25. This 2-period game is 
a subgame of the 3-period game with pies of $5, $2.50. and S1.25: if the 
initial offer had been rejected in the 3-period game. the players would have 
320 PART SIX 
found therru;elves playing twO more periods equivalent to the separate 2-period 
game that they did play. After the separate 2-period game. they played another 
3-period game. followed by another 2-period game. and so on. 
Subjects initially split the 55 equally in the 3-period game, just like the 
subjects in eelin. Sonnenschein, and Spiegel's study. Then they played a 
2-period game and saw that the first player ended up with S 1.25 . Players mov-
ing first gradually realized that player 2 would get only SI.25 in the 3-period 
game if she rejected the initial offer, so they gradually raised their initial de-
mands to $3 .75. the perfect equilibrium prediction. 
Perfect equilibrium in the 3-period game resulted from seeing the results of 
future periods (subgames) played out-from experiential backward induc-
tion-rather than from hypothetical backward induction. 
In this particular game. experiential backward induction also taught them 
that they did not have to be fair (player I gets 53 .75 of the $5 pie), though an 
equal split was a natural division to start with. A reasonable conjecture is that 
players in unfamiliar bargaining environments begin by behaving fairly. If the 
environment favors one person over another, they gradually learn of the ad-
vantage and exploit it (see Binmore. Shaked, and Sutton 1985). 
Strategic and Sincere Voting 
Experiential backward induction also teaches people to vote strategically in 
the presence of a voting agenda. The experiment of Eckel and Holt (989). 
shown in figure 13.1 , is a good example. Nine subjects vote on three a11er-
natives. A. B. and C. Three subjects. called A voters. prefer A to C to B 
(written A > C > B) because the experimenter pays them 53 if A is elected. 
$2 if B is elected. and $1 if C is elected. Three B voters have prefere 
B > A > C, and three C voters have C > B > A. 
Subjects were given a fixed agenda. On the first vote. they chose either {A. 
B} or {B. C} (i .e . . they would decide which one of A and C would later run 
against B) . If {A. B} was voted in. on the second vote they chose A or B; i 
{B. C} was voted in. they chose B or C. 
Players are said to vote " sincerely" if they vote for the set that contains 
their most preferred alternative. Under sincere voting. A voters would vOle for 
{A. B} over {B, C}. B voters would too. so {A. B} would win. In the {A. B} 
runoff. A would get only three votes (from the A voters) and lose to B. It is 
myopic for A voters to choose {A. B} in the first stage because they will cad 
up with B. which they like least of all . It is smaner for A voters to vOle "sua-
tegically" by choosing {B. C} in the fin;t stage (voting against their true pref-
erence). thereby setting up a runoff between B and C that C would win. (A 
voters would rather end up with C than B. Note that it does not pay for B orC 
voters to vote strategically.) 
The entire 2-period game was repeated about 10 times in the experiment. 
No A voters voted strategically (for (B, C}) at first . but half their votes were 
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Figure 13 .1. A voting game (Eckel and Hoi' 1989). Preferences: A voters. A > C > B; 
B VOle ... B > A > C; and C vOIers. C > B > A. 
were made public before the voting did not malter much: as in ,he sequential 
bargaining experiments. subjects seemed to learn by living through future pe-
riods (experiential backward induction) rather 'han by thinking about them 
(hypothetical backward induction). 
JUDGMENTS OF CHOICES BY OTHERS 
Players in games must make judgments about choices of other players. 
(This is what distinguishes games from decisions most sharply.) The decision-
theoretic approach treats choices by others as random events. like weather 
or disease (Kadane and Larkey 1982). The garne-theoretic approach treats 
choices by others as special because their choices can be predicted (nature 
cannot) if we know what they earn. think they are rational. and believe they 
have the same presumption of us. 
The crucial question is how much faith one has in human rationality. Har· 
sanyi (1982.121). a game theorist. objects to the decision-theoretic approach 
because it "would amount to Ihrowing away essential information. viz . . the 
assumption ... that the players will act rationally and will also expect each 
other to act ralionall y'" To call the mutual rationality assumption "informa-
tion" seems curious (unless a mathematician is talking): an assumption is a 
hypothesis, subject to test. Game theory just provides a benchmark from 
which systematic deviations of the mutual rationality assumption are defined . 
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R~pUlDlion Games 
Harsanyi (1967-68) suggesled Ibal games in which players have priv ... 
information could be modeled by assummg Ihal nalUre generales a player's 
"Iype," which alTecls payoffs and which is known only to Ibal player (lbough 
olhers know Ibe probabilities of various types). When played repealedly, such 
games provide a nalUral model of the formal ion of repulations. Games lik. 
Ihis are fashionable m economics and political science as models of lahor and 
produci markelS. sirikes, campaigns, and so on (Wilson 1985). 
Camerer and Weigel! (1988) experimenled with a repulation game consist-
ing of eighl plays of the I-period ("stage") game shown in figure 13.2. The! 
game is a simple model of building truSI. Firsl, nalure delermines Ibe entre-
preneur's (E) Iype. either honesl (p = . 1) or dishonesl (p = .9). The banker 
(B) does nOI observe E's Iype. Her ignorance is shown in figure 13.2 by lum 
ing Ihe honesl and dishonesl nodes of Ihe lree logelher in an information 
enclosed by a dOlled ellipse. B knows Ibal she h alone of the Iwo nodes in 
information SCI. bUI she does nol know which one. 
B eilber offers a loan or does nol. If Ibe loan is olTered. E chooses whelher 
10 pay back or renege. NOlice thai E knows her own type ; she knows whelher 
she is on Ibe left (hones!) part of the lree or Ibe righl (dishonesl). If she is 
dishonest, she prefers reneging (earning 150) 10 paying back (earning 60). If 
she is honesl , she prefers paying back. earning 60 inslead of O. A single 
plays the game eighl times againsl dilTerenl Bs. Each B can observe what 
pened before. E knows her own Iype before Ihe 8-period game. bUI B 
only the probability of each Iype. 
The sequenlia! equilibrium ' is complicaled. An honesl-type E should al-
ways pay back. A dishonesl-lype E should never renege in Ihe firs! few plays. 
Ihen should begin using a "mixed slrategy" - a probabilislic combination 011 
"pure" slralegies- wilh an increasing probabilily of reneging each period. 
( In the eighth period. a dishonesl E should cenainly renege. ) Once Ibe dishon-
eSI E begins mixing. B should begin mixing 100, lending wilb a probability 
.64. The dishonesl E plays a mixed slralegy because E waDIS 10 mainlain a 
repulation for possibly being honesl by paying back 10arlS for as many periods 
as possible. (Once she reneges. her repulalion is ShOl, and she gelS no _ 
loans.) She does nol wanl 10 renege in the same period every lime, or !he B's 
will catch on and wilhhold loans in Ibal period . 
In Ihe firsl 20 or so 8-period games. subjeclS devialed from the game-
theoretic equilibrium in decision-theoretic ways . For instance, when E • 
neges in an early period . Bs should learn thai she is dishonesl and refuse III 
make loans. Inslead. many Bs would lend in laler periods, and E would 
renege again. Thinking decision theoretically, they regarded these bad I.-
4. Actually. there arc many sequenrial equilibria. 'The one we pick OUI is the only one (hal .... 
















Figure 13.2. The bankeHntreprcllCur reputation game (Camerer and Weigeh 1988). 
Note that the upper (lower) payoff is the banker's (enuepreneur·s). 
as gambles thaI mighl be paid back because E's choice is unpredictable. 
Thinking game IheoreticallY-knowing E's payoffs and assuming her ratio-
nality- makes the choice predictable: laler loans will nOI be paid back . (They 
were nOl .) 
In newer experiments. we measured subjects' estimates of the probability 
of having a loan paid back in each period of each game. Probabililies were 
biased in familiar way (e.g .. extreme probabililies arc used 100 often; see 
Lichlenslein. Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982). The mOSI slriking finding is thaI 
other E players were betler than B players al eSlimating whether a particular E 
would pay a loan back. though the Bs and Es had exactly Ihe same objeclive 
data available to them when they made estimates. II appears Ihal being in the 
same game-Iheoretic role as another player improves insighl. helping subjects 
learn mutual rationality, just as playing fUlUre periods helps subjecls back-
ward inducl. 
After many 8-period games, play did converge remarkably closely 10 the 
equilibrium prediclioos. There was one persistent systematic deviation: dis· 
honesl E subjecls did nOI renege as early in the game as predicled . This devia-
tion makes sense if players believe Ihal a fraction of dishonesl Es (around 16 
percenl) will always behave honestly. This is further evidence of cooperalion , 
as discussed above, because any E can do betler by nOI behaving honestly bUI 
eXira honesl players increase profils for everyone . 
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Refinements of Nash Equilibrium 
In games willt many equilibria. lite need to judge othe~' choices correctly 
is especially acute. Theorists have developed rules for evaluating the logic of 
different equilibria . called "refinements." 
Many refinements have been described for incomplete-information games 
like the banker-entrepreneur game. Another example is the education game 
between students and employe~. shown in figure 13.3 (adapted from Cho and 
Kreps 1987). It is a signaling game in which an informed party chooses a 
signal that another party sees and responds to. 
In the education game. students are of two types. bright and dim. (Assume 
plbrightJ = .6 and pJdimJ = .4.) A student observes her type, lIten decides 
whether to attend college or not (the signal). Employe~ see whether a student 
went to college or not and decide whether to hire her. but employe~ do not 
know whether the student is bright or dim. Students get a payoff of 2 units of 










- I 0 
NillUrt determines 






















Figure 13.3 . The education game (adapled from Coo and Kreps 1987). NOie Ihal 
upper (lower) payoff is the student 's (employer's). 
BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 
avoiding college if they arc dim. Employers get I for hiring a bright student 
and lose I for hiring a dim one. 
There are two pure-strategy sequential equilibria in the education game. In 
one equilibrium, both bright and dim students skip college. (This is called a 
--pooling-' equilibrium because both types cboose the same strategy and enter 
a Common pooL) Since both types skip college. employers using Bayes's rule 
realize that p(bright I no college) = p(bright) = .6. They then hire, earn-
ing an expected utility of .6(1) + .4( - I) = .2 (instead of not hiring and 
earning 0) . 
For th is to be a Nash equil ibrium_ employers must not hire a student who 
went to college. (Otherwise. skipping college would not be a best response for 
a bright student. ) For the equilibrium to be sequential (a refinement of Nash). 
employers must have beliefs that make not hiring a college skipper rational. 
To make not hiring rational. employers must believe that I' (brightlcollege) 
< .5 (then the expected utility of hiring is less than zero. the certain value of 
hiring) . 
Since p (brighl) = .6. the employer is acting as if going to college lowers 
the perceived probability that the student is bright. This inference seems back-
ward . Dim students cannot possibly do any bener by leaving the --equilibrium 
path-- (where they earn 3) and going to college. Bright students might do 
beller (they earn 2 in the equilibrium and might earn 3 by switching) . A logi-
cal refinement called the "'intuitive criterioo" (Cho and Kreps 1987) states 
that p (bright lcollege) should be one if bright students might benefit from col-
lege and dim students certainly will not. But then it is optimal for employers 
to hire if they observe college (earning them I for sure), which makes going to 
college a best response for bright types. shattering the equilibrium. The re-
sulting equilibrium does pass the intuitive criterion: all students go to college 
and get hired; students who skip college are thought probably to be dim and 
do not get hired . 
In experimental tests of such games. the judgments of others' choices are 
often decision theoretic rather than game theoretic . For instance. undergradu-
ates in a game-theory course made the choices shown in table 13.1. Subjects 
were asked what they would do at every possible point in the game. If dim. 
only six of 43 subjects would go to college: if bright, all go to college. As 
employers. 41 of 43 would hire college goers. but only seven of 43 would hire 
college skippers. Their logic is not game theore,ic because. when dim stu-
dents decide to skip college. they are apparently not thinking 'hrough what 
rational employers would do-no, hire-if faced with a college skipper. (In 
this experiment. their choices as dim students are inconsistent with their own 
choices as employers.) 
In more thorough experiments (Brandts and Holt 1987). dim types sk.ip 
college 70 percent of the time. A natural explanation is that subjects are 
making "maximin" choices. maximizing their worst possible outcome. (In 
the education game. dim types can get at least I by sk.ipping college.) Maximin 
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TABLE 1.1.1 




D,m 6 37 
Brighl 43 0 
Employer chotee: 
Hire 41 7 
Not hire 2 36 
NOlI! . N .. 43 . 
choices are defensible in many contexlS (when Ihe sum of all payoffs is con-
stant, a Nash equilibrium necessari ly consists of maximin choices), bUI nO( 
here: players choosing according to maximin are regarding choices by others 
as less predictable (or more malicious) than they truly are . Bank, Camerer. 
and Poner (1988) reponed related resullS but found that choices were nOl al-
ways consistent with the maximin rule. 
SOME PARAUELS WrrH BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY 
My general approach builds behavioral game theory up around the special 
features of games. deliberately distinguishing it from behavioral decision the-
ory. The two have much in common as well. 
COlllexl 
Seemingly innocuous changes in context affect the outcomes of games. For 
instance. experiments and surveys described above suggest that perceived 
fairness of decisions is sensitive to the method by which decision-makiag 
power w"' granted. 
Schelling (1960) noted that many games with several equilibria haw: 
"focal points"-"psychologically prominent" equilibria-that are suggeslal 
by context and circumscribed by culture. An example appeared in GtIIWS 
magazine in November 1988. Readers were shown canoons of nine celebrities 
and instructed to "vote" for one celebrity. If you voted for the celebrity re-
ceiving the most votes. you became eligible for prizes. The reader's job WIS 10 
guess what people would do. knowing that those people would be guessing 
what others would do. ad infinitum. 
The Games game has nine equilibria in pure strategies, one for each celeb-
rity: those who think that the largest number of people will vote for Pee W" 
Herman will VOle for him too: those who think that Shirley MacLainc wiD 










Figure 13.4. A game in which contexi matters (van Damme 1987). 
R 
0.0 
aged to achieve a remarkable consensus: Bill Cosby won the actual contest 
(1,489 votes) , edging out Lee lacocca (1, 155 voters) and distancing the seven 
lesser-known celebrities (2.639 votes combined). The same game in another 
contexl- with strategies labeled 1-9 or A-I-would not have produced such 
consensus . 
The celebrity game i. a "coordination game": people are better ofT if they 
can coordinate their choices. doing what others do. In coordination games. 
context sets historical precedent. which has great innuence (see. e.g. , van 
Huyck . Battalio, and Beil 1988). For instance. driving on the right side of the 
road is a coordination equilibrium in America (now enforced by law) because 
of a convention established centuries ago. In England, a different history cre-
ated a,differem convention, driving on the left.) 
A final example of context is shown in figure 13.4 (see van Damme 1987). 
Player I moves first, choosing I or r. If r is chosen. players I and II playa 
simultaneous move game (shown in malrix form). The matrix game has two 
Nash equilibria in purc strategies (circled): (T, L), yielding (3. I). and (B. R). 
yielding ( I , 3) . 
If the matrix game were played separdtely. there is no reason to think that 
either equilibrium is more likely (unless labeling of strategies induces a focal 
point). But playing the matrix game after player I moved r is different. The 
matrix game is now circumscribed by context: by giving up her payoff of 2 
(from 12, 5]) and taking her chances on the matrix game. player I is hinting to 
player 1I that they should play the equilibrium that gives her a payoff of 3 (i .e . . 
IT. Lj). Why else would she give up a certain payoff of 2? (This reasoning is 
5. 1be American conVf:ntion wa.'i established by rarmers driving large (eams orhorscs to market. 
They sal on the left rear hOfSC so thai they could lash the learn with a Whip. right handed . Since 
they were siulng on the lefl . accidents were best avoided ir oc.her teams passed on the left; lhcy 
dro\'e on the nght. EnglLS.h dri vers sal up on smaller carnages with a load behind them. A whip 
lashed right handed would get caught in the load ir drivers salon lhe len. so lhey sat on the righl . 
Drivers passed on the right. Historical COntexl maUers: on an otherwise identical planet with more 
leFt-handed drivers. Amertcans wou ld drive on the lefl. the English on the right. 
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called "forward induclion": moves are assumed 10 lell players somelhing 
aboul imenlion in fUlure subgames.) In Ihis game. foregone choices provide a 
context: the COntext might matter because foregoing a choice means somelhing. 
Feedback and Learning 
The process of learning is crucial and almosl complelely neglecled in game 
Iheory. An exceptional model is Harsanyi 's "Iracing procedure" (1975; cf. 
Fudenberg and Kreps 1988). Players begin by guessing the probabilities wilb 
which other players choose strategies . Then Ihey choose strategies thaI maxi-
mize their own expected utilicy given Iheir guesses. This procedure yields an 
oplimal slralegy for each player: guesses are revised by shifting probability 
onlO each players optimal strategy. and the procedure is repeated umil an 
equi librium emerges. The lracing procedure was proposed as a description of 
the way players lhink before Ihey pl ay thc game, but it seems even more useful 
as a model of learning across plays . 
Behavioral decision theory suggests a simple model of learning: people re-
spond 10 feedback by changing slralegies until they reach a point from which 
they can do no beuer-the hallowed grounds of equilibrium . Convergence 
thus require three ingredients: feedback must be clear, immediate. and re-
pealed; subjects must inlerpret feedback correctly, realizing that they can do 
beuer, and ubjects must change in the correct direction. ' The most dramatic 
learning occurs in experiments thaI satisfy all three condi lions. Recall the 
strategic voting experiment of Eckel and Hoh (1989: fig . 13 . 1 above). In 
the second slage, A voters get clear feedback aboul the implicalions of their 
first-stage vote. Since their worst outcome is elected. subjects realize thai a 
change can only help. Since there is o nly one way for them to change (by 
voting for {B. C} instead of {A, B}). they cannol help bUI change in the right 
direction . 
In most of the sequential bargaining (pie-spl iuing) experimems. learning 
conditions were poor, and convergence was too. Subjecls gol no feedback 
aboul how much beuer they would do if Ihey made more aggressive offers 
because inilial olTers were rarely rejecled . When feedback was provided by 
playing subgames separately (in Harrison and McCabe's experiment). sub-
jects converged remarkably close to perfect equilibrium. 
Lack of feedback has an interesting effect in a game sludied by Scholler. 
Weigeh, and Wilson (1988). Their game is depicled in extensive fonn in fiB-
ure 13.5 and in normal form in table 13.2. 
Player I moves first. There are Iwo Nash equilibria, (L, I) and (R. r). 
(Only the IR, rl equilibrium survives logical refinemenls.) If player I regards 
player 2's choice as a random variable rather than an oplimal aClion deducible 
by introspection. she may choose L because il guaranlees a payoff of 4 (il is 
the maximin slralegy) . BUI r dominales I for player 2. Player I should realize 
6. Hilly Einhorn's inHucnce here (e.g .. Einhorn 1980) should be obvious. 
4 
4 
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Figure 13.5. A transparency game (Schotter, Weigelt . and Wilson 1988). Note that the 
upper (lower) payoff is player I 's (player 2·s). 
TABLE 13.2 










litis and choose R, earning 6 instead of 4. When the game was hown in tree 
form (fig . 13.5), player I subjects chose R 98 percent of the time. Shown the 
game in matrix form (table 13.2), player I subjects chose R only 44 percent of 
lite time. Presenting the game in tree form seems to make it transparent that r 
is a dominant strategy for player 2 (cf. Keller 1985). 
In this experiment. subjects were told only their own payoffs at the end of 
each period. When player I subjects chose L, they learned that they got 4. but 
litey did not know whether player 2 chose I or r. I suspect that feedback is 
crucial for generating convergence in this matrix game: without knowing 
more than just liteir payoff. player I subjects could not be sure Iit.t R was a 
better choice than L. (Feedback on player 2's choices did cause player I to 
switch from L to R in classroom experiments.) 
Levels of £;Cplanalion 
An important finding in behavioral decision theory is that simple linear 
models may explain complicated judgments "pararnorphicaJly," without de-
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TABLE 13.3 
A GAME WITH It MIX£I>.STlATEGY EQu IUBR.IU .. 
------- -------------~ 
Column Player Frequency 
2 3 Predkted Actual 
Row player: 
I - 5.5 5. -5 5. -5 - 5.5 .20 .221 
2 5. - 5 - 5. 5 5. - 5 - 5.5 .20 .215 
3 5. - 5 5. -5 -5.5 -5.5 .20 .203 
J - 5.5 - 5. 5 -5 . .5 5. -5 .40 .362 
Frequency; 
Predicted .20 20 .20 .40 
Actual .226 .179 .169 .426 
Sourc~. O'Neill (1987) . 
scribing the detailed process of judgment very well (Einhorn. KleinmunlZ, 
and KleinmunlZ 1979). Models Ihal work well alone level (overall j udgment) 
work poorly al a less-aggregaled level (judgmcnl process). A similar phe-
nomenon occurs with prediclions of mixed-strategy play. A mixed . tralegy is 
a random choice (or "probabilistic mixture") of pure slralegies . 
Consider the game in table 13.3 (used by O'Neill 1987). There is no pair of 
stralegies that are mutual best responses. However. if Ihe column player 
chooses Ihe stralegies (I, 2, 3. J) with probabilities (.2 .. 2 . . 2, .4). then the 
row players expeeled utilily is Ihe same for all siralegies (- I). A mixed Stral-
egy with the same probabilities is therefore a weak besl response to the col-
umn player (no olber stralegy is hener: no other stralegy is worse ei lher). 
O'Nei ll (1987) found Ihal subjeclS played each slralegy with an overall f~ 
quency remarkably close 10 Ihal predicled (Ihe dala are shown in lable 13.3), 
bUI Ihe prediclions are much less impressive al Ihe individual level. (Brown 
and Rosenlhal 119871 rejeci the predictions for a Ihird of Ihe subjects II 
p < .05.) Like paramorphic models, Ihe mixed-Slralegy prediclion works 
well alone level but fails al another. 
In banker·entrepreneur repulation games (Camerer and Weigell 1988), 
relalive frequencies of choices were remarkably similar 10 Ihe predicted proba-
bililies overall, bUI individuals cbose differenl panems. which were of len de-
lerminislic rather than mixed (e.g., pay back umil period 5, then renege). 
Since differem people cbose differem delerminislic panerns, a player facing a 
randomly chosen opponent confmnled an unpredictable slrategy cboice, 
which was cfTeclively mixed . 
Bull , Schoner. and Weigel! (1987) observed the opposile phenomenon in 
their experimental " tournaments:' A tournament is a labor contract in which 
players choose efTort levels (higher efTorl is more COSily) and oUlPUI is lhe sum 
of efTOr! and a random variable. The player wilh Ihe largesl OUlPUI wins a 
BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 
fixed prize (e.g .• tenure or the company presidency) . In their experiments, 
there is a unique pure·strategy equilibrium-subjects should choose the same 
effort level each time. Average effort was remarkably close to the level pre-
dicted. but individual effort varied dramatically over time and across people 
(perhaps because subjects tried to outguess the random variable. as in proba-
. bitity matching). The Nash equilibrium prediction was quite accurate in the 
aggregate but cannot explain individual variation. People cannot generate ran-
dom sequences easily (e.g., Baddeley 1966). though they can learn to do so 
with extensive fecdback (Neuringer 1986). Thus. it is not surprising that 
people do not mix slrategies mndomly (for almost half O'NeiJl"s subjecls. 
choices depended on Iheir own previous choices). Nonrandom mixing is 
lroublesome for game lheory because it changes equilibrium stmtegies if sub-
jects can delect it. It would be useful to know if lhey can detect it. 
CONCLUSION 
My argument is that game theory relies on deseriptively inadequale as-
sumption; of the two feature; lhat distinguish games from decisions. The firsl 
feature is that games yield a payoff to each player. If players care about olbers' 
payoffs. predictions based purely on self-interest will be wrong. A wide vari-
ety of dala suggesl lhat people lypically do prefer fair payoffs (often equal 
ones) but thallheir concern for fairness is context dependent. People also try 
to cooperale by making personal sacrifices to maximize joint gains. 
The second fealure i; that, in games. players mUSl judge the choices lhal 
olhers will make (including themselves in the future). The special assumption 
of equilibrium analy,,, in game theory is that such judgmenls arc made by 
considering how olhers wi ll behave if lhey are rational. Dala suggest that 
people do not consider others. They are also myopic in ant icipating their own 
future choices . 
Of course, we should nOl abandon game theory simply because people vio-
late it. Equilibrium prediclions provide a handy. precise target thai people 
move lOward. Subjects usually begin experiments playing fairly. myopically. 
and decision lheoretically. Gmdually. lhey learn to accepl unfair outcomes. 
plan ahead. and expect rational choices by others (if the equilibrium dictates 
that they sbould). A central queslion for behavioral game theory is learning 
conditions for convergence. 
The natura! hypothesis is lhat clear. informative feedback and the ability to 
adapl are necessary for convergence. Most of the experiments surveyed are 
especially conducive to learning. and convergence usually occurs (but never 
immediately). More experiments lhat are less conducive to learning (like the 
sequential bargaining experiments in which unreached subgamcs are not 
played) would be useful to see if convergence fails. 
Then we must ask when people converge to equi libria in the natural world. 
Is the world more like the first period of an experiment or the last? The answer 
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is surely mixed. Novice negotialors, firsl-lime home buyers. and newlyweds 
are probably initially myopic in sequential bargaining, like inexperienced sub-
jects. Veterans of painful mikes or divorces have lived through subgames (as 
experienced subjects have): they are probably nOl so myopic in new games. 
Practice may help too: novice salesmen rehearse the closing of a sale (imagin-
ing the end of their sequential bargaining with customers before it begins): 
hopeful lovers might do the same before a date. 
If subjects can learn. an important question is how well learning in one 
selling transfers 10 another setting. Is behavior in Ihe first period of an ex-
periment like that in the lasl period of a similar experiment? There are 
good reasons to be pessimistic about transfer (on the "winner's curse," see. 
e.g., Kagel and Levin 1986.909- 10). but Ihere are too fcw data to say any-
thing more . 
Broader data would be especially useful in developing behavioral game 
theory. In virtuaJly all the experiments described in this chapter. researcbers 
collecled only the data needed to test the normalive theory thaI they consid-
ered (choices. typically). It is easy to collect lots of olher data, like judgments 
of what others will do (e.g .. Selten and Stoecker 1986). process measures . or 
protocols. From those data. we can make game theory more behavioral, and 
better. 
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